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Abstract
This thematic issue advocates a range of novel theoretical and methodological directions applicable to cybersecurity stud-
ies. Drawing on critical International Relations theory, Science and Technology Studies, participant observation, quantita-
tive political science, and other social science methods and theory, the contributors advance modes of invigorating the
exploration of cybersecurity as an assemblage of sociotechnical practices. In so doing, this issue seeks to enhance un-
derstanding of the politics and strategies of cybersecurity, one of the most complex and diverse technical and political
challenges of our contemporary world.
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1. Introduction
This thematic issue suggests novel theoretical and
methodological approaches to the analysis of global
cybersecurity. From obscure technical origins in com-
puter science and information security, cybersecurity
has emerged as a major political consideration for states,
multilateral organizations, firms and civil society in the
early twenty-first century. The briefest survey of news
headlines will reveal diverse cybersecurity issues af-
fecting contemporary societies, from low-level Internet-
enabled criminality to military cyber operations and
strategic interventions via computer networks in the do-
mestic affairs of world powers. These are functions of
economic and political motives but are enabled and ex-
acerbated by our increased reliance on and imbrication
with transnational assemblages of information technolo-
gies. To date, the struggle to regulate and govern this
complex landscape is mirrored by a lack of diversity in
the theory and methods used to comprehend this novel
environment and to understand political responses to its
problems. This thematic issue hopes to offer ideas for re-
dressing this imbalance.
2. Cybersecurity Studies: The State of the Field
Cybersecurity studies are affected by the conditions of
the historical and discursive emergence of the object of
its enquiry. The term ‘cybersecurity’ can be traced back
to at least the late 1980s and its conceptual antecedents
much further, but its present usage is relatively recent.
Even practitioners charged with technical aspects of cy-
bersecurity did not self-identify as ‘cybersecurity’ pro-
fessionals until the 2000s (Denning & Frailey, 2011),
when national policy documents also began to use the
term. The subsequent rapidity of cybersecurity’s rise as
concept and practice, and its convergences with other
forms of security, has hindered definitional consensus,
such that ‘no one can agree precisely what cybersecu-
rity means, or requires’ (Bambauer, 2012, p. 587). This
is regrettable to some but also offers opportunities for
productive engagements with cybersecurity that interro-
gate and contest an unsettled field of policy and practice.
We can offer a broad definition of cybersecurity as
‘a means not only of protecting and defending society
and its essential information infrastructures but also
a way of prosecuting national and international poli-
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cies through information-technological means’ (Stevens,
2016, p. 11). This highlights cybersecurity’s ontological
and processual characteristics and its contingent rela-
tions with information technologies, particularly the In-
ternet. It recognizes that cybersecurity is not merely de-
fensive, as shown through its attempts to generate po-
litical effect through active transnational intervention
and engagement. This implies that various theories and
methods might be appropriate for exploring cybersecu-
rity but these have yet to attract the attention they per-
haps deserve. We have not progressed far beyond the
situation noted a decade ago, that cybersecurity studies
are oriented to solving policy problems at the expense
of theory-building and methodological innovation (Eriks-
son & Giacomello, 2007, p. 2). Cybersecurity is worthy
of such academic work—and there are many excellent
such contributions—but few cybersecurity scholars have
yet to transcend the ‘hectic empiricism’ and ‘consequent
theoretical sterility’ afflicting security studies in general
(Buzan, 2000, p. 3).
Exceptions to this include an established literature on
the securitization of cybersecurity and a growing inter-
est in Science and Technology Studies (STS), each chan-
neling intellectual currents in security studies and Inter-
national Relations (IR). Securitization studies record the
discursive construction of cyber threats and identify ten-
sions between political claims and the objective condi-
tions to which they refer (Conway, 2008; Dunn Cavelty,
2008, 2013; Hansen&Nissenbaum, 2009; Lawson, 2013).
This work complements other critical engagements with
cybersecurity language, particularly the role of analo-
gies and metaphors in knowledge construction (Betz &
Stevens, 2013; Lawson, 2012). STS-inflected studies ex-
amine non-discursive facets of cybersecurity, generating
sociotechnical analyses of the co-construction of mate-
rial and immaterial actors in cybersecurity assemblages
(Aradau, 2010; Balzacq & Dunn Cavelty, 2016; Stevens,
2016). We should also recognize rich deployments of
classical IR theory (Kello, 2017) and theories of risk and
governmentality (Barnard-Wills & Ashenden, 2012; Deib-
ert & Rohozinski, 2010; Stevens, 2015). As the contribu-
tions to this thematic issue signal, there is further scope
for expanding how we understand cybersecurity’s many
conceptual and empirical manifestations.
3. New Directions in Theory and Methods
McCarthy (2018) addresses one of the core problematics
of the field, asking whose interests cybersecurity serves.
The article explores public-private partnerships (PPPs),
a common form of organization seeking to balance pri-
vate critical infrastructure ownership with the state’s re-
sponsibility to provide cybersecurity as a public good.
Extant discussions of PPPs assume binary distinctions—
public/private, state/market—that obscure power rela-
tions. McCarthy’s PPPs are reproductive of a liberal or-
der that constructs these binaries in the interests of the
few, thereby undercutting the narrative of cybersecurity
as a public good. Rather, they should be understood as a
means of entrenching the privatization of political power.
This illuminates the roles of the private sector in infras-
tructure design and ownership, its warping effects on cy-
bersecurity provision and political decision-making, and
the utility of critical materialism to examining the proper
role of cybersecurity in democratic contexts.
Collier (2018) and Dunn Cavelty (2018) illustrate the
relevance of STS concepts and methods to cybersecurity.
LikeMcCarthy (2018), Collier (2018) describes the porous
nature of the boundaries between conventional bina-
ries like local/global and employs assemblage thinking
to sketch the multiplicity of actors and interests compet-
ing and combining in cybersecurity. Importantly, this arti-
cle demonstrates how these assemblages shift over time,
creating hybrid and contingent structures that generate
new forms of action and actors. DunnCavelty (2018) uses
bibliometric data to discern two main clusters in the cy-
bersecurity literature: a technical focus on cybersecurity
as a means to fix ‘broken’ objects and a social-scientific
perspective that diagnoses the perceived misuse of tech-
nological artefacts as a problem to be solved by external
intervention. Dunn Cavelty submits that actor-network
theory can bridge this gap by describing the relations be-
tween technical and sociopolitical objects. Tracing these
linkages exposes how cybersecurity knowledge is formed
in practice.
Articles by Shires (2018) and Coles-Kemp, Ashenden
and O’Hara (2018) articulate a commitment to investi-
gate sociological sites of cybersecurity. Through partic-
ipant observation of cybersecurity conferences, Shires
(2018) introduces the notion of ‘ritual’ space-time per-
formativity of expertise. Systematized rituals of organiza-
tion and presentation reproduce commercial logicswhile
creating an illusion of neutral cybersecurity knowledge, a
doublemove Shires identifies elsewhere in cybersecurity.
This explains key features of cybersecurity actors’ self-
identities and disciplinary epistemology, while establish-
ing the potential of ethnography for excavating meaning
from situated cybersecurity practices. Similarly, Coles-
Kemp et al. (2018) undertook community research to
show how institutional decisions on cybersecurity tech-
nology design obscure digital service-users’ needs and
desires. This establishes that cybersecurity measures
must develop community trust by design, rather than in-
creasing citizen’s insecurity and thereby failing to achieve
collective security gains. This is a significant corrective to
conventional readings of cybersecurity as a ‘top-down’
venture by commercial and political elites.
Valeriano and Maness (2018) and Gomez and Villar
(2018) bring quantitativemethods to bear on established
cybersecurity problems. Valeriano andManess (2018) re-
port on a long-term project to gather data on interna-
tional cyber conflict, through which to test hypotheses
of state actions and intentions. Contrary to received wis-
dom, for example, they find that states are restrained in
their use of offensive cyber capabilities, which explains
the historical dearth of escalatory incidents. The authors
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point towards the fertile use of data-sets in cybersecu-
rity research and recommend avenues for establishing
data integrity and reliability. Gomez and Villar (2018) ac-
count for feelings of ‘dread’ that accompany the types
of assumptions about cyber threats disputed by Valeri-
ano and Maness (2018). From experimental data they
find that imperfect information and lack of experience
elevate actors’ levels of uncertainty and likelihood of
developing fearful reactions to cyber threats. The au-
thors propose several ways in which embracing ‘eco-
logical rationality’ can improve individual and collective
decision-making.
The final article (Whyte, 2018) raises a number of
epistemological challenges for cybersecurity research as
seen through the lens of the philosophy of (social) sci-
entific enquiry. Many of these might be ameliorated by
adopting a cross-community ‘monism’ that prioritizes
consistency of terms of reference, yet encourages diver-
sity within a discrete research program. Whyte outlines
a capacity-building agenda to improve community co-
operation and research standards and his article consti-
tutes a progressive call for solidarity within cybersecu-
rity studies.
4. Conclusion
Eachof the articles in this issue offers something provoca-
tive and innovative for future cybersecurity research. To-
gether, they offer new or revised methods of data col-
lection and theoretical frameworks that assist in interro-
gating cybersecurity as an assemblage of sociotechnical
practices and politics.We look forward to scholars engag-
ing with this collection and to working with us to deliver
on the promises of its individual and collective proposals.
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